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COMMENT

YOUNG AND DANGEROUS: THE ROLE OF YOUTH IN RISK
ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS
Ingrid Yin*
States are increasingly adopting risk assessment instruments (RAIs) to help
judges determine the appropriate type and length of punishment for an offender. Although this sentencing practice has been met with a wide variety of
scholarly criticism, there has been virtually no discussion of how RAIs treat
youth as a strong factor contributing to a high risk score. This silence is puzzling. Not only is youth undoubtedly the most powerful risk factor in most
RAIs, but youth also holds a special place in the criminal justice system as a
“mitigating factor of great weight.” This Comment presents the first in-depth
critique of RAIs with respect to their treatment of youth. It argues that, as currently designed and implemented, RAIs both contradict longstanding and
widespread views about the proper role of youth as a factor in punishment and
undermine efforts to craft proportionate sentences consistent with principles of
justice and modern social science.
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INTRODUCTION
Risk assessment instruments (RAIs) are becoming increasingly influential
in courtrooms throughout the country. 1 Developed from the crude psychological assessments of the 1930s, RAIs use actuarial science to calculate the
likelihood of an individual committing a crime in the future. 2 These tools are
now used across the criminal justice system—informing decisions about bail,
the length and nature of the sentence, and parole. 3 Many jurisdictions have
already adopted RAIs for one or more of these purposes, and the evidence
suggests that more are likely to follow. 4 The popularity of RAIs, however, belies their problematic consequences: RAIs have the perverse effect of imposing
longer sentences on young offenders than on older offenders for the same conduct. 5 Such a result is inconsistent with centuries of criminal justice doctrine
regarding the punishment of youth and may well frustrate contemporary advancements in criminal justice policy. 6
The appeal of these tools is obvious. RAIs, if accurate and used correctly
(two big ifs), could make huge advances toward a more effective, accurate, and
equal criminal justice system. 7 Proponents argue that RAIs can decrease crime
by helping judges effectively identify—and thus separate—the most dangerous
individuals from the general population. 8 At the same time, RAIs reveal which
individuals are less likely to commit crimes in the future, allowing judges to recommend more lenient sentences for these offenders. 9 Proponents also argue

1. Sonja B. Starr, The Risk Assessment Era: An Overdue Debate, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 205,
205 (2015) (“[W]e are already in the risk assessment era.”). These tools are also commonly referred to as “risk assessment tools,” “actuarial risk assessments,” or simply “risk assessments.”
2. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2221–22, 2222 n.5 (2019).
3. Starr, supra note 1, at 205.
4. See infra notes 24–28 and accompanying text.
5. See Megan T. Stevenson & Jennifer L. Doleac, Algorithmic Risk Assessment in the Hands
of Humans, SSRN 3–4 (Apr. 21, 2021), https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3489440 [perma.cc/954859RA].
6. See infra Part III.
7. See generally Jordan M. Hyatt, Mark H. Bergstrom & Steven L. Chanenson, Follow the
Evidence: Integrate Risk Assessment into Sentencing, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 266 (2011).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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that RAIs promote accuracy and equality by providing judges with objective,
statistically supported information to guide their subjective risk assessments. 10
Despite their potential benefits, RAIs have not been immune to criticism.
In fact, a sizable body of literature challenges RAIs’ promises of scientific objectivity and accuracy. 11 Critics argue that, rather than avoiding the subjectivity of human discretion, RAIs codify and veil the biased judgments and data
on which they base their statistical analyses. 12 Critics point to studies showing
that RAIs falsely identify Black men as future criminals at twice the rate that
white men are falsely identified. 13 In addition to these concerns about objectivity, critics also raise doubts about the accuracy of RAIs more generally. For
example, software engineer Julia Dressel and digital-forensics scholar Hany
Farid concluded that a popular RAI was “no more accurate or fair than the
predictions of people with little to no criminal justice expertise.” 14
Amid the crossfire between empiricists, another line of criticism has
emerged. This critique, driven mostly by law professors and scholars, focuses
not on RAIs’ predictions but on the means by which these tools make their
determinations. 15 RAIs use statistical correlations between crime and characteristics such as age and sex to determine the likelihood of a specific individual
with these characteristics committing certain crimes in the future. 16 Because
these calculations are used to make decisions concerning bail, sentencing, and
parole, the result is that an individual’s case can be significantly affected by
personal traits in jurisdictions that use RAIs. 17 Such treatment sits uncomfortably with our idealized notions of impartial justice; capitalizing on these intuitions, scholars have urged states to reject RAIs as violative of the Equal
Protection Clause and for being bad public policy. 18 RAIs’ consideration of
sex, employment status, income, education, dependence on government assistance, job skills, criminal history, family criminality, and other traits have
been criticized on these grounds. 19

10. Id.
11. See, e.g., Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias,
PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing [perma.cc/U9RJ-6WSM]; Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES art. eaao5580 (2018),
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aao5580.
12. See Angwin et al., supra note 11.
13. Id.
14. Dressel & Farid, supra note 11, at 3.
15. See, e.g., Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization
of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803 (2014).
16. Erin Collins, Punishing Risk, 107 GEO. L.J. 57, 64 (2018).
17. Starr, supra note 15, at 804–05.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 870 (“The inclusion of demographic and socioeconomic variables in risk prediction instruments that are used to shape incarceration sentences is normatively troubling and,
at least with respect to gender and socioeconomic variables, very likely unconstitutional.”);
Melissa Hamilton, Back to the Future: The Influence of Criminal History on Risk Assessments, 20
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But there has been virtually no discussion of RAIs’ use of youth in legal
or empirical scholarship. 20 The literature’s silence on the matter is particularly
surprising in light of the extensive body of law that has developed over the last
several centuries surrounding the punishment of young people. 21 And, considering that youth is the most predictive factor in a risk assessment score, 22 a
conversation about the advisability of RAIs is incomplete without a thorough
analysis of their particular effects on young people and their (in)compatibility
with our system’s longstanding practices regarding the punishment of youth.
This Comment fills this gap by arguing that the use of RAIs that treat
youth as an aggravating factor in sentencing decisions contradicts our justice
system’s well-established commitment to treating young people more leniently. Continued application of these tools, as currently designed and implemented, also replicates dangerous mistakes of the past. While RAIs are used
throughout the criminal justice system, this Comment will focus primarily on
their use in sentencing. An analysis of the sentencing stage provides a particularly compelling picture of the criminal justice system’s otherwise-tenderhearted treatment of youth and thus offers an exceptionally stark illustration
of the hypocrisies relating to RAIs’ treatment of youth as an aggravating factor.
These issues are not unique to sentencing, however, and the tools used at sentencing are often the very same tools used at bail or parole. 23 As such, this Comment’s arguments have broader implications for the other uses of RAIs as well.
Part I provides an overview of the structure, development, and use of
RAIs. It also explains the role of youth in RAI calculations. Part II then traces
society’s evolving understanding of the proper role of youth in punishment,
beginning with the common law infancy defense and progressing to the science-based understanding we have today. Lastly, Part III analyzes the ways
that RAIs’ treatment of youth as an aggravating factor conflicts with principles
concerning the proper role of youth as a factor in punishment.

BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 75, 133 (2015) (“Actuarial risk assessment has unfortunately amplified the
impact of criminal records, and, using questionable sources, can qualify as evidence of past offending. As illuminated by the Back to the Future theme, the potential reconstruction of an individual’s prior record often may have the unfortunate effect of altering an individual’s future.”).
20. Only one other article has directly addressed the issue. See Megan T. Stevenson & Christopher Slobogin, Commentary, Algorithmic Risk Assessments and the Double-Edged Sword of
Youth, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 681 (2018). While Professors Stevenson and Slobogin presents a compelling picture of the “double-edged” nature of youth, this Comment further explores these inconsistencies through a historical analysis of the criminal justice system’s punishment of young people.
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 691–93.
23. For example, the COMPAS algorithm is used for both pretrial and sentencing determinations. Farhan Rahman, COMPAS Case Study: Fairness of a Machine Learning Model, TOWARDS
DATA SCI. (Sept. 7, 2020), https://towardsdatascience.com/compas-case-study-fairness-of-a-machine-learning-model-f0f804108751 [perma.cc/3YRU-XSPM]; see also discussion infra Section I.A.
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BACKGROUND ON RAIS

In 1994, Virginia became the first state to adopt an RAI for use in sentencing. 24 By 2019, twenty-eight states had adopted a similar kind of RAI. 25
There is reason to think that there will be even more expansion in the future:
politicians, sentencing commissioners, and other policymakers have argued
in support of RAIs. 26 So have organizations like the National Center for State
Courts and the American Law Institute. 27 As sentencing scholars Mirko Bagaric and Gabrielle Wolf stated, “[i]t seems inevitable that transparent and validated risk assessment tools will progressively be used in sentencing.” 28
This Part provides an overview of RAIs and considers how youth affects
an offender’s risk of recidivism. Section I.A describes the different kinds of
RAIs, from simple checklists to complex machine-learning algorithms. Section
I.B summarizes how judges use RAIs to make sentencing decisions. Section I.C
reviews the biological differences between young people and older people and
assesses how these differences contribute to higher risk scores for the former.
A. Structure and Development of RAIs
While most RAIs consider youth, the structure of these tools differs
greatly. The most basic are essentially checklists, most often consisting of
seven to fifteen factors. 29 Each factor is associated with a number of points
depending on that factor’s association with future crime. 30 The points are then
totaled into a cumulative risk score. 31 Some RAIs further categorize risk scores
into low-, medium-, or high-risk groups, while others have a cutoff score under which an individual is recommended for alternative sentencing. 32 When
RAIs categorize offenders’ scores into risk groups, judges typically receive
only the offender’s overall risk category, not the risk factors or calculations
used to generate these labels. 33

Starr, supra note 15, at 809.
Risk Assessment Tool Led to Harsher Sentences for Young and Black Defendants,
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Nov. 25, 2019), https://eji.org/news/risk-assessment-tool-led-toharsher-sentences-for-young-or-black-defendants [perma.cc/C4BG-KGE6].
26. Collins, supra note 16, at 60.
27. Id.
28. Mirko Bagaric & Gabrielle Wolf, Sentencing by Computer: Enhancing Sentencing
Transparency and Predictability, and (Possibly) Bridging the Gap Between Sentencing Knowledge
and Practice, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 653, 680 (2018).
29. Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 509–11 (2018).
30. Id. at 509.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 513; see also, e.g., VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, RE-VALIDATION OF THE NONVIOLENT
OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENT: STUDY UPDATE 3, http://www.vcsc.virginia.gov/Nonviolent%20Offender%20Risk%20Assessment%20Update%2011-14-11%20HANDOUT.pdf
[perma.cc/NGJ6-KBEV].
33. See Collins, supra note 16, at 63–68.
24.
25.
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One example of a checklist-style RAI is Virginia’s Nonviolent Offender
Risk Assessment (NVRA). The NVRA was developed by the Virginia Criminal Sentencing Commission to “identify drug and property offenders who
were at the lowest risk of committing a new crime.” 34 Its goal was to divert
these low-risk offenders from prison to noncarceral interventions, like outpatient drug or mental health care programs. 35 The NVRA uses a variety of factors—such as offense type, sex, age at time of offense, and prior felony
convictions—to determine the offender’s total score. 36 Those who score
thirty-eight points or fewer are recommended for an alternative punishment,
while those who score thirty-nine points or more are not. 37
By contrast, the most advanced RAIs are developed through machinelearning techniques in which computers use data to repeatedly revise their
own predictive algorithms. 38 The way these tools work is less clear. Although
the programmer selects the training data, the factors to use, and the outcomes
to predict, the algorithm determines the rest. 39 It decides how heavily to weigh
each factor, as well as how the factors interact with one another. 40
One example of a machine-learning RAI is the Correctional Offender
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS). The COMPAS
was developed by a corporation called Northpointe and has been adopted in
multiple states, including New York, Wisconsin, California, and Florida, for
both pretrial and sentencing determinations. 41 The COMPAS algorithm uses
the results of a 137-item questionnaire to evaluate an individual’s risk of recidivism. 42 Once calculated, an individual’s risk is assigned a risk score between one and ten—one being the least likely to commit another crime and
ten being the most likely. 43 A score of one indicates that the offender’s score
is in the bottom ten percent of all scores, a score of two indicates that the offender’s score is in the bottom twenty percent of all scores, and so on. 44

34. BRANDON L. GARRETT, ALEXANDER JAKUBOW & JOHN MONAHAN, VA. CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y REFORM PROJECT, N ONVIOLENT RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA SENTENCING:
THE SENTENCING COMMISSION DATA 3 (2018), https://www.law.virginia.edu/system/files
/news/spr18/UVA%20Law%20NVRA%20Sentencing%20Analysis%20and%20Judicial%20Surv
ey,%20March%201,%202018.pdf [perma.cc/FML7-YNJ5].
35. Id. Potential alternative punishments include “jail, release, probation, community service, outpatient substance-abuse treatment, or electronic monitoring.” Id.
36. VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 32, at 3.
37. Id.
38. See Richard Berk & Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT’G REP. 222, 223–24 (2015).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. Rahman, supra note 23.
42. Id.
43. NORTHPOINTE, COMPAS RISK & NEED ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (2012), http://www
.northpointeinc.com/files/downloads/FAQ_Document.pdf [perma.cc/VXR4-V8MC].
44. Id.

December 2021]

Youth and Risk Assessment Instruments

551

It is important to mention that because the COMPAS was developed by a
corporation, its algorithm is proprietary and subject to trade secret protections. 45 While Northpointe (now known as Equivant) has voluntarily released
the risk factors used in the COMPAS, it has not explained how these factors
are used to calculate an individual’s risk of recidivism. 46 In 2016, Eric Loomis
challenged this lack of transparency, arguing that the use of the COMPAS in
the determination of his sentence violated his due process rights, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected his claim. 47
B. Use of RAIs in Sentencing
Sentencing procedure is mostly structured by the legislature. 48 Due to the
few constitutional restraints on sentencing, legislatures decide which punishments can be imposed, who can impose them, and what guidance the sentencing authority receives. 49 Statutes authorizing incarceration often impose
mandatory minimum and maximum sentences for specific crimes. 50 Some
statutes, however, authorize the sentencing authority to depart from the typical range when certain mitigating or aggravating factors are present in the
case. 51
Typically, the trial judge determines an offender’s punishment. 52 Some
states give judges broad discretion to impose any sentence within the provided
statutory range, but others have adopted certain mechanisms to limit judicial
discretion. 53 To make their sentencing decisions, judges rely on information
provided in a presentence report. 54 Presentence reports are prepared by probation officers after an in-depth interview with the offender. 55 They contain information about the offender’s background, prior criminal record, medical
evaluations, employment history, and financial circumstances. 56 In jurisdic-

45. Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 690.
46. See Risk Scores: The Not-So-Secret Recipe, EQUIVANT (Aug. 14, 2020),
https://www.equivant.com/risk-scores-the-not-so-secret-recipe [perma.cc/BME8-LM7E].
47. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
48. 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 26.1(a) (4th ed. 2015).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 26.1(c); see also CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45074, MANDATORY
MINIMUM SENTENCING OF FEDERAL DRUG OFFENSES 6–7 (2018) (listing mandatory maximum
and minimum sentences for various federal drug offenses).
51. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, § 26.5(b); see also, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b), 851 (increasing the statutory maximum when the defendant is found to have committed a prior “felony
drug offense”).
52. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 48, § 26.2(a).
53. Id. § 26.1(a).
54. Id. § 26.5(b).
55. Id.
56. Id.

552

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:545

tions that use RAIs, an offender’s risk score is usually included in the presentence report, often without any guidance on how the judge should use this
information. 57 The presentence report has been called “the single most important document at both the sentencing and correctional levels of the criminal process.” 58
RAIs can impact two major sentencing decisions. First, RAIs can influence what type of punishment an offender receives. 59 For example, depending
on the risk score of the individual, the NVRA recommends that judges either
sentence the offender to prison or to an alternative punishment. 60 While this
recommendation is discretionary, studies show that low risk scores do, in fact,
increase an offender’s likelihood of receiving an alternative punishment, and
high risk scores increase an offender’s likelihood of being sent to prison. 61
Second, RAIs can affect a judge’s decision regarding the length of an offender’s punishment. 62 Some jurisdictions authorize judges to exceed sentencing-guideline recommendations for offenders who pose a high risk of
recidivism. 63 One such jurisdiction is Kansas, which has adopted RAIs for the
sentencing of juvenile offenders. 64 Under the Kansas Sentencing Commission
guidelines, low- or medium-risk juveniles may be sentenced to up to fifteen
months, while high-risk juveniles may be sentenced to up to eighteen months. 65
Even in jurisdictions that do not authorize departures from sentencing
maximums for high risk scores, empirical studies suggest that a high risk score
nonetheless induces judges to give offenders longer sentences. 66 Some of this
happens subconsciously through a psychological phenomenon known as the
anchoring effect. 67 Anchoring occurs when an initial data point, even if completely arbitrary, provides a reference point for all subsequent judgments. 68
When making the sentencing decision with an RAI, judges may start with an
initial anchor—namely, the sentence they would have given absent the risk
score—and increase or decrease the length of punishment in the direction of

57. Collins, supra note 16, at 66.
58. Stephen A. Fennell & William N. Hall, Due Process at Sentencing: An Empirical and
Legal Analysis of the Disclosure of Presentence Reports in Federal Courts, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1613,
1623 (1980).
59. Collins, supra note 16, at 69–72.
60. See VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 32.
61. GARRETT ET AL., supra note 34, at 3 (finding that 42.2 percent of low-risk offenders
received alternative sentences compared to only 23.4 percent of high-risk offenders).
62. Collins, supra note 16, at 67–69.
63. Id. at 67–68.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See Starr, supra note 15, at 867–70.
67. See J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making After the
Blakeley Revolution, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301, 325–33.
68. Id.
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the risk score. 69 A high risk score may thus result in a sentence length significantly longer than the anchor, while a low risk score may result in a sentence
length significantly shorter than the anchor.
Furthermore, judges tend to give RAIs additional weight in sentencing
because of their perceived objectivity, legitimacy, and determinacy. Sentencing is often a high-stakes, emotional process that involves the complicated balancing of many indeterminate factors. 70 Of these factors, risk predictions can
be one of the most difficult to accurately assess. Judges might be hesitant to
heavily weigh considerations that cannot be neatly measured when conducting their own risk calculations. 71 RAIs, however, provide judges with concrete
and seemingly precise assessments of risk. Their scientific “legitimacy” can
persuade judges to rely on them more heavily. 72 At the very least, judges might
be more likely to rely on RAI risk scores because they are more determinate
than other sentencing factors. 73
The trend towards automation is likely to result in harsher punishments
being imposed on young offenders. Because judges use an offender’s risk to
determine the type and length of punishment, the weight that RAIs give to
youth can increase the likelihood and length of incarceration for young offenders. 74 After Virginia adopted an RAI that heavily weighed age at time of
offense as an aggravating factor, offenders younger than twenty-three were 4
percent more likely to be incarcerated than older offenders. 75 Their sentences
were also 13 percent longer than those of their older peers. 76 For example, an
older offender sentenced to three years in prison would have received, on average, four extra months in prison if the offender had been younger than
twenty-three. To put it differently, young offenders in Virginia often spend
more time in prison because of the adoption of an RAI.
C. Youth’s Role in RAIs
This Section discusses the relationship between youth and RAIs’ main focus, namely, assessing recidivism risk. Before proceeding, however, a few terminological clarifications are needed. This Comment uses the words “youth”

69. Collins, supra note 16, at 68.
70. E.g., Starr, supra note 15, at 866; Thomas M. Hardiman, Foreword, 49 DUQ. L. REV.
637, 637 (2011) (“Balancing the principles animating the criminal law—incapacitation, retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence—is difficult in and of itself, and the inherent subjectivity of
the enterprise makes the task even more challenging.”).
71. Starr, supra note 15, at 865–66.
72. Id. (noting that judges overweigh other “expert” evidence as well).
73. See id.
74. See infra Section I.C.
75. Stevenson & Doleac, supra note 5, at 3–4.
76. Id. Note that these figures reflect the fact that judges sentenced young offenders less
harshly than recommended by their risk scores. Full compliance with the sentencing recommendations would have resulted in a 15 percent increase in the probability of incarceration and a 60
percent increase in the length of incarceration. Id.
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and “young people” in accordance with their scientific, rather than legal,
meanings. While the legal age of majority in most states is eighteen, 77 this
bright-line rule is merely a crude approximation of what science has made
clear: there are characteristics associated with youth that justify treating
younger people more leniently than older people. 78 Recent studies have concluded that many of these characteristics remain present in individuals well
into their twenties. 79 Thus, scientific discourse uses youth to refer to the lower
end of a sliding scale of developmental, neurological, and emotional maturity.
In light of these two conceptions of youth—the scientific sliding-scale definition and the legal bright-line definition—this Comment will employ different
terms to refer to each. When discussing the former, more indeterminate category, this Comment will refer to “young people” (in contrast to “older people”). When discussing bright-line legal definitions, this Comment will refer
to “juveniles” (in contrast to “adults”).
1.

The Age-Crime Curve

Youth is a highly influential aggravating factor in many RAIs, including
the COMPAS and the NVRA. According to a study reverse-engineering the
COMPAS algorithm, age alone explains 57 percent of the variation in scores
indicating risk of violent recidivism, “substantially more” than any other factor. 80 Equivant admits as much on their website, which states that “ ‘age at first
arrest’ is weighted the heaviest.” 81 Similarly, the NVRA assigns an individual
thirteen points for being younger than thirty when the crime was committed. 82 For comparison, the tool only assigns nine extra points if the individual
has had five or more adult incarcerations. 83
In addition to the fact that age heavily factors into a high risk score, age
may also correspond to other risk factors, essentially “double-counting” the
offender’s age. For example, the NVRA assigns nine points to an offender who
is not regularly employed during the two years prior to arrest. 84 But, as young
people are expected to go to school rather than work, young people are less
likely to be regularly employed and less likely to have been regularly employed
for long periods of time. Thus, the offender’s age is counted twice: once for
being younger than thirty at the time of the offense and a second time for being not regularly employed. In this case, age contributes twenty-two points to

77. Alexandra O. Cohen, Richard J. Bonnie, Kim Taylor-Thompson & B.J. Casey, When
Does a Juvenile Become an Adult? Implications for Law and Policy, 88 TEMP. L. REV. 769, 770
(2016). The age of majority is the legal age of adulthood. Id.
78. See infra Part II.
79. See infra Section II.C.1.
80. Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 691–93.
81. Risk Scores: The Not-So-Secret Recipe, supra note 46.
82. VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 32.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the young offender’s risk score, representing well over half of the points
needed to be disqualified for alternative punishment under the NVRA. 85
Youth is so heavily weighted in RAIs due to its strong correlation with
criminal behavior. 86 This correlation, referred to by sociologists as the “agecrime curve,” demonstrates that all types of crime rise quickly during adolescence, peak around late adolescence or early adulthood, and rapidly decline
thereafter, leveling off slowly well into adulthood. 87 Although some variation
exists regarding the parameters of the age-crime curve, sociologists have discovered similarly shaped relationships between crime and age across numerous societies and time periods. 88
The age-crime curve can be explained by both biological and social factors. Neuroscientific evidence, such as noninvasive brain imaging and postmortem studies, indicates that different regions of the brain develop at
different paces during adolescence and early adulthood. 89 Specifically, the prefrontal cortex—responsible for judgment and self-control—does not fully develop until an individual’s mid-twenties, whereas the subcortical limbic
regions—responsible for desires and fear—develop mostly between the ages
of thirteen and seventeen. 90 This asymmetric development results in a decreased ability to inhibit inappropriate desires, emotions, and feelings. 91
When faced with high social or emotional pressure, “the limbic regions of the
brain may hijack less mature prefrontal regions leading to an imbalance or
overreliance on these emotional regions.” 92 As a result, when young people
experience negative emotional stress, they demonstrate diminished cognitive
capacity when compared to adults. 93 Thus, young people are inherently more
susceptible to criminal activity.
Additionally, adolescence and early adulthood are both periods of significant identity exploration, increasing young people’s willingness to engage in
risky behaviors like crime. 94 Generally speaking, parent and teacher surveillance decreases during this time, and adolescents and young adults have not
yet formed new attachments to significant others, children, or occupations

85. Id.
86. Jeffery T. Ulmer & Darrell Steffensmeier, The Age and Crime Relationship: Social Variation, Social Explanations, in THE NURTURE VERSUS BIOSOCIAL DEBATE IN CRIMINOLOGY 377,
378 (Kevin M. Beaver, J.C. Barnes & Brian B. Boutwell eds., 2015) (“It is now a truism that age
is one of the strongest factors associated with criminal behavior.”).
87. Id. at 389.
88. Id. at 380–81.
89. See Mariam Arain et al., Maturation of the Adolescent Brain, 9 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC
DISEASE & TREATMENT 449, 451–52 (2013).
90. Cohen et al., supra note 77, at 783.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 784.
93. Id. at 786.
94. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett, Emerging Adulthood: A Theory of Development from the Late
Teens Through the Twenties, 55 AM. PSYCH. 469, 473–75 (2000).

556

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 120:545

that impose restraining influences. 95 This instability provides young people
with the opportunity to experiment with their identities in a way that is impossible during other age periods. 96 Part of this experimentation might involve engaging in criminal activity. 97 Psychologists believe that this feature of
young adulthood explains why certain risky behaviors, like unprotected sex,
substance abuse, and driving while intoxicated, peak between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-five. 98
But as young people enter into their twenties, they settle down, commit
to partners, have kids, and take on steady employment. 99 Research indicates
that these prosocial bonds strongly decrease an individual’s likelihood to engage in criminal activity. 100 Additionally, young people tend to reach neurological maturity during this time, specifically in the prefrontal cortex region. 101
Thus, both biological and social factors contribute to a natural tendency of
young people desisting from crime after early adulthood. 102 Only about five
percent of young offenders continue to commit crimes into adulthood. 103
2.

Implications for Criminal Justice Policies

Young people’s natural desistance has powerful implications for criminal
justice policies regarding youth. First, sentences that keep young offenders incarcerated long after they’ve aged out of their prime crime years are unlikely
to prevent future crime and thus may be unnecessary and undesirable. 104 Second, incarceration of young offenders may actually increase criminality by interfering with young offenders’ natural tendency to “age out” of their
crimes. 105 Young offenders are less likely to make prosocial connections with
adult role models or other law-abiding peers while incarcerated. 106 Addition-

95. Michael Rocque, Chad Posick & Justin Hoyle, Age and Crime, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 5 (Oct. 2, 2015), https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118519639.wbecpx275.
96. Arnett, supra note 94, at 475.
97. ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 53
(2008).
98. Arnett, supra note 94, at 474–75.
99. Id. at 473–75.
100. Rocque et al., supra note 95, at 5.
101. Arain et al., supra note 89, at 452.
102. See, e.g., Michael Massoglia & Christopher Uggen, Settling Down and Aging Out: Toward an Interactionist Theory of Desistance and the Transition to Adulthood, 116 AM. J. SOCIO.
543 (2010).
103. SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 97, at 53.
104. Rocque et al., supra note 95, at 6.
105. Id.
106. Ian Lambie & Isabel Randell, The Impact of Incarceration on Juvenile Offenders, 33
CLINICAL PSYCH. REV. 448, 451 (2013); Tirza A. Mullin, Note, Eighteen Is Not a Magic Number:
Why the Eighth Amendment Requires Protection for Youth Aged Eighteen to Twenty-Five, 53 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 807, 816 (2020).
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ally, they are less likely to develop an identity, sense of purpose, or self-awareness in a prison environment. 107 Failure to make prosocial connections and
develop a sense of identity or purpose increases a young offender’s risk of recidivism once released back into society. 108 Thus, while it may be tempting to
address young people’s increased risk of reoffending by locking them up, such
measures will likely be counterproductive. Instead, alternative punishments
(like those recommended for low-risk offenders by the NVRA) may be more
effective in reducing recidivism among young offenders.
In light of young offenders’ unique qualities, the criminal justice system
has created an extensive system of juvenile justice that deemphasizes incarceration and incapacitation in favor of rehabilitation and leniency. Part II discusses this system in greater detail.
II.

THE PAST AND PRESENT OF PUNISHING YOUTH

The criminal justice system has a widespread and longstanding policy of
treating young people more leniently than older people. Although society’s
views on how best to deal with young offenders have changed over time, scholars, judges, and lawmakers have consistently emphasized that youth should
mitigate punishment. Only during the superpredator era—a deplorable period in the late 1980s and 1990s characterized by mass hysteria over a predicted rise in juvenile violent crime—were these principles temporarily
abandoned. Today, there is widespread acknowledgement that the superpredator theory and its resulting reforms were misguided and destructive. As
a result, scholars, judges, and lawmakers have reverted to the previously established policy of lenient punishments for youth. Section II.A surveys society’s understanding of youth’s relationship to criminal behavior at common
law and through the development of the juvenile justice system. Section II.B
then examines the superpredator era. Section II.C observes modern-day views
concerning the punishment of young offenders, finding support for leniency
in recent legislative reforms and constitutional case law.
A. The History of the Juvenile Justice System
American criminal law has always recognized a fundamental distinction
between juveniles and adults. As early as the fourteenth century, 109 the common law recognized an infancy defense that afforded significant protections
to young people of all ages. 110 The scope of the defense depended on the kind
of crime at issue in the case. In capital cases, the defense created the presump-

107. Mullin, supra note 106, at 816.
108. Id.
109. Emily Buss, What the Law Should (and Should Not) Learn from Child Development
Research, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 13, 19 (2009).
110. Craig S. Lerner, Originalism and the Common Law Infancy Defense, 67 AM. U. L. REV.
1577, 1583, 1587–94 (2018).
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tion that children lacked criminal capacity, meaning that children were presumed incapable of possessing the requisite criminal intent to warrant punishment. 111 This presumption was irrebuttable for those under seven and
rebuttable for those between seven and fourteen. 112 In misdemeanor cases, the
infancy defense was even more expansive, offering a complete defense for individuals up to the age of twenty-one in some situations. 113
The infancy defense was the sole protection for juvenile offenders during
the early years of American history. 114 However, some scholars did contemplate additional protections. For example, in debates over the imposition of
the death penalty on juvenile offenders, Sollom Emlyn, a prolific eighteenthcentury legal writer, argued that the death penalty was inappropriate because
of young people’s potential for “reformation.” 115 Thus, during the first few
centuries of American history, criminal law and scholars acknowledged two
distinctions between juveniles and adults that justified leniency towards the
former: juveniles’ decreased culpability and their potential for reformation.
Starting in the late nineteenth century, conceptions of juvenile culpability
changed as the Progressive Era brought widespread social reform to all aspects
of society, including criminal law. 116 The Progressives adopted a positivist
view of criminal behavior. 117 They believed that crime was a product not of
intrinsic moral failings but of extrinsic factors that could be addressed through
rehabilitation. 118 In accordance with these views, the Progressives advocated
for a separate justice system for juveniles, one where criminal law and procedure would have very limited influence. 119 Under this system, juvenile courts
would treat offenders as misguided yet fundamentally innocent—in need of
proper supervision, treatment, and control rather than punishment. 120 The state

111. Id. at 1590–94.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1588–90.
114. See Buss, supra note 109, at 12.
115. 1 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 25 n.t (Sollom Emlyn
ed., London, E. & R. Nutt & R. Gosling 1736) (“[Y]et in the common instances of larceny and
stealing some other punishment might be found, which might leave room for the reformation
of young offenders.”).
116. See Buss, supra note 109, at 20–21.
117. Andrew M. Carter, Age Matters: The Case for a Constitutionalized Infancy Defense, 54
U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 719–20 (2006).
118. Id. at 720.
119. See Lara A. Bazelon, Note, Exploding the Superpredator Myth: Why Infancy Is the Preadolescent’s Best Defense in Juvenile Court, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 159, 171 (2000).
120. See ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT
36 (1978) (“Perhaps the most influential idea in shaping the juvenile court system was the thesis
that the defect which produced juvenile crime lay not so much in the child as in the environment
from which he had come and, therefore, that no child should be treated as a criminal.”); Elizabeth
S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Essay, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 804 (2003).
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would act as juveniles’ guardians, promoting their wellbeing while using individualized treatments to direct them on a law-abiding path. 121 The first juvenile court was established in Illinois in 1899, 122 and a little over a decade later,
all but two states had created their own juvenile alternatives to criminal courts. 123
But the Progressives’ vision for the juvenile justice system never really
took hold. After the mid-twentieth century, the juvenile justice system underwent an identity crisis of sorts as scholars and lawmakers argued over its future. 124 States had grown disillusioned with the rehabilitation model, and
lawmakers passed statutes to reformulate the goals of the juvenile justice system to include accountability and protection of the public. 125 And, recognizing that juvenile courts had become more punitive, the Supreme Court issued
a series of decisions applying procedural protections from the adult system to
juveniles, eroding some of the distinctions between the two court systems. 126
Despite this new emphasis on public safety and procedural protections,
the juvenile justice system still viewed offenders as having diminished capacity
and focused on sentencing these offenders in proportion to their culpability. 127 It also continued to recognize juvenile offenders’ potential for growth,
focusing on providing juveniles with services designed to prepare them for
adult life. 128 But the juvenile justice system was soon to face a strong challenge
to its founding commitments to proportionate, rehabilitative, and individualized sentencing. Starting in the late 1980s, mass hysteria involving unsubstantiated fears of juvenile violence overtook the nation, prompting large-scale
121. Bazelon, supra note 119, at 172. One of the fundamental tenets of American juvenile
justice is parens patriae, the principle that the state is authorized to intervene to protect people
who are unable to care for themselves. See Buss, supra note 109, at 23.
122. Lisette Blumhardt, Comment, In the Best Interests of the Child: Juvenile Justice or
Adult Retribution?, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 341, 343 (2000).
123. Id.
124. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 120, at 805–06.
125. Id. The public abandoned the rehabilitation model because “little evidence suggested
that it worked to reduce crime.” Id. at 805 n.27. Additionally, because of the focus on rehabilitation, juveniles in the juvenile justice system were not given access to certain rights that adults
received in the more punitive adult system, leading some to argue for the abolition of the juvenile
justice system. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and Sentencing Policy, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 68 (1997).
126. In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court noted that juvenile offenders often receive
the “neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children.” 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). The Court went on to issue a series of decisions holding that certain constitutional protections were required in juvenile proceedings. See,
e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33–34, 41, 55, 57 (1967) (extending rights to notice, counsel, confrontation, and fair and impartial hearing, as well as protection against self-incrimination, to
juvenile offenders).
127. Even after Gault, the Court still embraced the idea of “compassionate justice” in juvenile courtrooms. Bazelon, supra note 119, at 175. Although it extended some constitutional protections to juveniles, it refused to transform the juvenile system into “a fully adversary process [that
would] put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal
protective proceeding.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (plurality opinion).
128. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 120, at 806.
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legislative reform and altering society’s long-held views of juvenile punishment.
B. The Superpredator Era
In the late 1980s and 1990s, spurred by an increase in juvenile violent
crimes, 129 widespread panic over a predicted rise of a particularly cruel and
violent breed of juvenile offenders overshadowed all other discussions of juvenile justice. 130 In a 1995 article, social scientist John DiIulio labeled these
offenders “super-predators,” describing them as “morally impoverished” juveniles who grew up “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal adults
in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless settings.” 131 Other
scholars reinforced this depiction, writing that superpredators were “radically
impulsive, brutally remorseless youngsters . . . who murder, assault, rape, rob,
burglarize, deal deadly drugs, join gun-toting gangs, and create serious communal disorders.” 132 They were incorrigible, 133 undeterrable, 134 and deadly. 135
Unless something was done, this “demographic time bomb” would result in a
“bloodbath of teenage violence.” 136
129. See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE
COURT 201 (1999) (stating that the juvenile violent-crime arrest rate increased 67.3 percent between 1986 and 1995). Although few disputed that juvenile violent crime rose during this time,
there was substantial debate over whether these statistics actually suggested a new generation of
juvenile offenders. Compare Franklin E. Zimring, The Youth Violence Epidemic: Myth or Reality?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 727 (1998) (attributing the increase to a rise in crimes committed
with handguns and changing police standards of what constitutes an assault or aggravated assault), with Judy Briscoe, Breaking the Cycle of Violence: A Rational Approach to At-Risk Youth,
FED. PROB., Sept. 1997, at 3, 3 (attributing the rise to an increase in children “born into and
reared in abject moral poverty”).
130. See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 120, at 807 (describing the superpredator era as a
“moral panic, in which the media, politicians, and the public reinforce each other in an escalating
pattern of alarmed reaction to a perceived social threat”).
131. John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27,
1995, at 23, 25 [perma.cc/N3H5-RS3H].
132. WILLIAM J. BENNETT, JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR. & JOHN P. WALTERS, BODY COUNT: MORAL
POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 27 (1996).
133. See, e.g., Grim Reality Check on Youth Crime, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 31, 1996),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1996-01-31-9601310006-story.html
[perma.cc/8TZJ-GLYH] (“The violence of their crimes and the apparent hardness of their hearts
mock our notions of ‘treatment’ and ‘rehabilitation.’ ”).
134. Briscoe, supra note 129, at 4 (“[M]any of today’s persistent young offenders cannot
be deterred from committing crimes simply by toughening the criminal penalties. . . . In fact, for
many youth, going to prison is a badge of honor or a rite of passage.”).
135. Criminologist James Wilson warned of “the prospect of innocent people being
gunned down at random, without warning and almost without motive, by youngsters who afterward show us the blank, unremorseful faces of seemingly feral, presocial beings.” James Q.
Wilson, What to Do About Crime, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1994, at 25, 26 [perma.cc/T4EK-PN32].
136. Richard Zoglin, Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME (Jan. 15, 1996),
http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,983959,00.html [perma.cc/HP8UHRRC]. Experts predicted that the population of juveniles would increase over the next fifteen
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The media soon adopted these problematic tropes, saturating American
viewers with images of violent and morally depraved juvenile offenders. 137
Five years after “superpredator” was first introduced into the American lexicon, the term was used nearly three hundred times by forty major news outlets, 138 including in articles such as “Moral Poverty” by the Chicago Tribune and
“ ‘Superpredators’ Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids?”
by Newsweek. 139 Print media was not the only source advancing this narrative;
popular talk shows, prime-time news programs, and television dramas all used
real-life juvenile violent crimes as inspiration for entertainment. 140 Even after
juvenile crime began declining, news coverage continued to explode. 141 According to one study surveying news outlets between 1987 and 1996, coverage
of juvenile delinquency increased thirty-fold during that period. 142
The media’s incessant portrayals of juvenile violence reinforced the superpredator narrative, magnifying the perceived threat juvenile offenders
posed to the public. A 1997 poll by the Los Angeles Times showed that 80 percent of respondents indicated that the media increased their personal fear of
being victimized by crime. 143 In another study conducted in 1999, 82 percent
of respondents felt that youth “d[id] not have as strong a sense of right and

years, “bod[ing] disastrously for society.” Briscoe, supra note 129, at 3–4. According to some,
the increase in juveniles, particularly male juveniles, would result in a doubling of the number
of juvenile arrests for murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault between 1996 and 2010.
John J. DiIulio Jr., Opinion, Stop Crime Where It Starts, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 1996), https://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/31/opinion/stop-crime-where-it-starts.html [perma.cc/546T-RTLP].
137. Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD.
L. REV. 849, 851–52 (2010). In many ways, the media had been primed for the dissemination of
the superpredator theory. First, the media began adopting an “infotainment” approach to reporting in the early 1990s, which prioritized celebrity and scandal and deemphasized policy and
data. Id. at 860. Second, the media started focusing much more on crime reporting. Id. at 861. The
1989 “Central Park Jogger” case provided the groundwork for the media’s later obsession with
juvenile crime; by the 1990s, crime was the most covered topic on the evening news. Id. at 861–64.
138. Carroll Bogert & Lynnell Hancock, Superpredator: The Media Myth That Demonized a
Generation of Black Youth, MARSHALL PROJECT, https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/11/20
/superpredator-the-media-myth-that-demonized-a-generation-of-black-youth [perma.cc/DVG6KS6F].
139. Moral Poverty, CHI. TRIBUNE (Dec. 15, 1995), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ctxpm-1995-12-15-9512150046-story.html [perma.cc/8LCD-VV9X]; Peter Annin, ‘Superpredators’
Arrive: Should We Cage the New Breed of Vicious Kids?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 1996, at 57 [perma.cc
/GTW9-CFBF].
140. Bazelon, supra note 119, at 165–66 (compiling sources).
141. LORI DORFMAN & VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BUILDING BLOCKS FOR YOUTH, OFF
BALANCE: YOUTH, RACE & CRIME IN THE NEWS 18 (2001), https://justicepolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/off_balance.pdf [perma.cc/ZK3W-NTCP].
142. Id.
143. Greg Braxton, Ratings vs. Crime Rates, L.A. TIMES (June 4, 1997, 12:00 AM), https://
www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1997-06-04-me-65443-story.html [perma.cc/9GYK-V33A].
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wrong” as fifty years earlier. 144 The public’s belief that juveniles were dangerous and morally immature likely influenced its preference for punitive responses to juvenile offending. Indeed, in 1995, the vast majority of Americans
believed that juveniles should be tried as adults if charged with a serious violent or property crime or with selling illegal drugs. 145
Lawmakers bought in as well, employing the term “superpredator” and
reinforcing the same fears about increasing juvenile crime rates. 146 Furthermore, legislatures passed a series of reforms designed to make it easier to funnel juveniles into the adult justice system. 147 States expanded the discretionary
judicial waiver process, lowering the age and increasing the range of offenses
for which juveniles could be transferred. 148 States also created two new forms
of transfer: mandatory transfer and prosecutorial transfer. 149 The former
made transfer to the adult system mandatory for certain crimes, while the latter empowered prosecutors to choose whether to try juveniles in the adult or
juvenile justice systems. 150 As a result of these reforms, the number of juveniles confined in adult facilities increased from approximately 1,600 in 1988
to more than 9,000 in 1997. 151
The superpredator theory is now widely viewed as a mistake—and for
good reason. 152 Despite a significant increase in the overall size of the juvenile
population, juvenile crime rates actually began to decline in the mid-1990s,

144. MEG BOSTROM, FRAMEWORKS INST., THE 21ST CENTURY TEEN: PUBLIC PERCEPTION
AND TEEN REALITY 6 (2001) [perma.cc/E6RU-7SWK].
145. Id. at 32 (listing the results at 87 percent, 70 percent, and 63 percent, respectively).
146. See, e.g., Dole Seeks to Get Tough on Young Criminals, L.A. TIMES (July 7, 1996, 12:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1996-07-07-mn-22017-story.html [perma.cc
/K34U-S65J] (reporting that then presidential candidate Bob Dole warned that “[u]nless something is done soon, some of today’s newborns will become tomorrow’s super-predators”); User
Clip: Hillary Clinton on ‘Superpredators’ in 1996, C-SPAN (Feb. 25, 2016), https://www.cspan.org/video/?c4582473/user-clip-hillary-clinton-superpredators-1996 (“They are not just
gangs of kids anymore. They are often the kinds of kids that are called superpredators.”).
147. Elizabeth S. Scott, Speech, Miller v. Alabama and the (Past and) Future of Juvenile
Crime Regulation, 31 LAW & INEQ. 535, 537 (2013).
148. Id.
149. Janet C. Hoeffel, The Jurisprudence of Death and Youth: Now the Twain Should Meet,
46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 29, 38 (2013).
150. Id. at 50, 60–61.
151. Moriearty, supra note 137, at 853.
152. See, e.g., Peter Nicholas, Bernie Sanders Says Bill Clinton Owes Americans an Apology,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 9, 2016, 11:42 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/BL-WB-62547 [perma.cc
/XE6Q-7ABJ]; Kim Taylor-Thompson, Opinion, Why America Is Still Living with the Damage
Done by the ‘Superpredator’ Lie, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com
/opinion/story/2020-11-27/racism-criminal-justice-superpredators [perma.cc/59VD-KRVY];
Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-threatof-90s.html [perma.cc/UVM5-JX8Q].
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and by 2009, juvenile crime rates were the lowest since 1980. 153 The same phenomenon occurred with juvenile homicide rates: during the decade from 2000
to 2009, there were fewer juvenile homicide arrests than in the four years between 1992 and 1995, the year the term “superpredator” was coined. 154 Scholars now agree that the decrease in juvenile crime rates was not attributable to
the reforms enacted during the superpredator era. 155 Rather, as the Surgeon
General concluded in 2001, the initial increase in juvenile violent crimes during the late 1980s and early 1990s was actually the result of “increased lethality
result[ing] from gun use, which ha[d] since decreased dramatically.” 156
Even the superpredator theory’s most vocal proponents have now retracted their support. John DiIulio, the social scientist that first labeled these
offenders “superpredators,” told the New York Times in 2001 that he had tried
“to put the brakes on the superpredator theory,” but he “couldn’t write fast
enough to curb the reaction.” 157 DiIulio later joined others in filing an amicus
brief in support of the petitioners in Miller v. Alabama, 158 stating that “the
predictions by the proponents of the juvenile superpredator myth . . . were
wrong.” 159 The brief concluded that, although the laws passed during this era
“threw thousands of children into an ill-suited and excessive punishment regime,”
they “had no material effect on the subsequent decrease in crime rates.”160
But the superpredator theory had an even more pernicious effect. In addition to needlessly subjecting juvenile offenders to adult prison environments where they were more likely to be assaulted 161 and deprived of
necessary developmental opportunities, 162 the theory created what has now

153. CHARLES PUZZANCHERA & BENJAMIN ADAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., JUVENILE
ARRESTS 2009, at 8 (2011), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/236477.pdf
[perma.cc/8V8P-J7F6].
154. Id. at 9.
155. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 37 (2010) (noting that studies examining these measures
concluded that there was “little support for the claim that the declining crime rates [were] largely
due to the enactment of harsher laws”); Franklin E. Zimring & Stephen Rushin, Did Changes in
Juvenile Sanctions Reduce Juvenile Crime Rates? A Natural Experiment, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
57, 59 (2013) (conducting an empirical study which “calls into question” the theory that superpredator era reforms decreased juvenile crime rates).
156. U.S. PUB. HEALTH SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., YOUTH VIOLENCE:
A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2001) [perma.cc/8SAE-LFYG].
157. Elizabeth Becker, As Ex-theorist on Young ‘Superpredators,’ Bush Aide Has Regrets,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2001), https://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/09/us/as-ex-theorist-on-youngsuperpredators-bush-aide-has-regrets.html [perma.cc/SXE6-H3QU].
158. 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see also infra Section II.C.
159. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 37, Miller, 567
U.S. 460 (No. 10-9646), 2012 WL 174240.
160. Id. at 37.
161. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 155, at 68 (noting that juveniles in prison are ten times
more likely to report being sexually assaulted than juveniles in juvenile facilities).
162. Id. (“Further, with little in the way of education, occupational training, or rehabilitation, many prisons provide minimal positive structure for inmates’ daily lives. In these facilities,
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been called the “superpredator virus.” 163 This “virus” is an unconscious and
racialized belief about which juveniles are most likely to commit crimes. 164 It
“installed [itself] into viewers’ racial schemas, where, without their knowledge,
the messages increased the viewers’ implicit biases about age, race, and causes
of and solutions to violent crime.” 165 During the superpredator era, proponents crafted the narrative of the dangerous Black juvenile, linking youth and
Blackness with violence and moral depravity. 166 DiIulio himself referred to the
predicted rise of juvenile crime as a “[B]lack crime problem” and estimated
that “as many as half of these juvenile super-predators could be young [B]lack
males.” 167 The media also played a prominent role in enforcing this stereotype:
local news programs across the country overrepresented juveniles of color as
criminals and underrepresented them as victims of crime. 168 As a result, the
superpredator era was especially harmful for juveniles of color, who were
much more likely to be arrested, detained, and transferred to the adult justice
system than white juveniles. 169 Specifically, four out of five juveniles detained
between 1983 and 1997 were juveniles of color. 170
C. The Modern Approach to Juvenile Justice
Today, a new era of juvenile justice has emerged—one that reflects the
pre-1980s approach of treating youth as a mitigating factor. Recent surveys
indicate that the public now favors a rehabilitative, rather than carceral, approach to juvenile crime. 171 Recognition of the mistakes made during the superpredator era has motivated many legislatures to pass statutes undoing
some of these ill-conceived reforms. 172 More and more, states are changing
their juvenile justice systems to reprioritize rehabilitation and keep young
people out of the adult justice system. 173 Some states are eliminating automatic

much time is spent in cells or in the prison yard with other prisoners under the surveillance of
guards on the perimeter.”).
163. Moriearty, supra note 137, at 887–90.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 889.
166. See id. at 865.
167. John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, https://
www.city-journal.org/html/my-black-crime-problem-and-ours-11773.html [perma.cc/EX88GBTR].
168. DORFMAN & SCHIRALDI, supra note 141, at 13.
169. ELEANOR HINTON HOYTT, VINCENT SCHIRALDI, BRENDA V. SMITH & JASON
ZIEDENBERG, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION REFORM:
REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION 10 (2001), https://assets.aecf.org/m/resourcedoc/aecf-Pathways8reducingracialdisparities-2001.pdf [perma.cc/JVM8-MK64].
170. Id.
171. GBA STRATEGIES, POLL RESULTS ON YOUTH JUSTICE REFORM 1 (2017) [perma.cc
/H4HR-Y5HX].
172. Scott, supra note 147, at 548.
173. Id. at 548–50.
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transfers of juveniles from the juvenile justice system to the adult justice system, as well as increasing restrictions on discretionary transfers. 174 Others are
raising the age of their juvenile justice jurisdiction cutoffs in light of new studies suggesting that youth development continues into one’s twenties. 175 For
example, Vermont passed a statute in 2017 making any offender under
twenty-two charged with a nonviolent crime eligible for juvenile-offender status. 176 Illinois, Connecticut, and Massachusetts have proposed similar bills. 177
The Supreme Court has also embraced a more nuanced understanding of
juvenile culpability that treats youth as a mitigating factor, holding that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.” 178
Starting in the mid-2000s, the Supreme Court issued three decisions addressing juveniles’ Eighth Amendment protections. In the first of these cases, Roper
v. Simmons, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on a juvenile offender. 179 The Court’s opinion, written by Justice Anthony Kennedy, rested in large part on the understanding
that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults. 180 Relying heavily on
modern social science and neuroscience, Justice Kennedy identified three crucial distinctions between juveniles and adults: juveniles’ “lack of maturity” and
“underdeveloped sense of responsibility,” 181 their unique “susceptib[ility] to
negative influences and outside pressures,” and their undeveloped characters
that were more likely to change over time. 182 In light of these differences, Justice Kennedy concluded that juveniles had diminished culpability when compared to adults, thus warranting additional protections. 183
Five years later, the Court reaffirmed this understanding of juvenile culpability. In Graham v. Florida, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment

174. JEREE THOMAS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUST., RAISING THE BAR: STATE TRENDS IN
KEEPING YOUTH OUT OF ADULT COURTS (2015–2017), at 25–34 (2017), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/StateTrends_Repot_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/T7CQ-D3TL] (identifying ten states that have restricted transfer mechanisms).
175. Tim Requarth, Neuroscience Is Changing the Debate over What Role Age Should Play
in the Courts, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 18, 2016, 10:01 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/2016/04/29
/young-brains-neuroscience-juvenile-inmates-criminal-justice-449000.html [perma.cc/MB4377W6].
176. See Act of June 13, 2017, No. 72, §§ 5, 2017 Vt. Acts & Resolves 521, 523–28 (codified
as amended at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 5280–5288 (Supp. 2020)).
177. John Kelly, In Another Big Year for “Raise the Age” Laws, One State Now Considers All
Teens as Juveniles, IMPRINT (June 25, 2018, 8:59 AM), https://imprintnews.org/youth-services-insider/juvenile-justice-raise-the-age-vermont-missouri-state-legislation/31430 [perma.cc/BL2Z2LEB].
178. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
179. 543 U.S. 551, 555–56, 578 (2005).
180. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
181. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 570–71.
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prohibited states from sentencing juveniles who commit nonhomicide offenses to life without parole. 184 Justice Kennedy, again writing for the Court,
emphasized that while the unique characteristics of a juvenile do “not absolve[] [him] of responsibility for his actions, . . . his transgression ‘is not as
morally reprehensible as that of an adult.’ ” 185 This decreased culpability rendered the severe penalty of life without parole disproportionate. 186
Most recently, in 2012, the Court addressed juvenile Eighth Amendment
protections in Miller v. Alabama. 187 Here, the Court addressed whether mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offenders who commit capital offenses violate the Eighth Amendment. 188 In concluding that they do,
Justice Elena Kagan, writing for the majority, again invoked the idea that biological differences between adults and juveniles justify treating the latter group
less harshly. 189 She pointed to prior opinions which stated that “criminal procedure laws that fail to take defendants’ youthfulness into account at all would
be flawed” 190 and that “the chronological age of a minor is itself a relevant
mitigating factor of great weight.” 191
This view of youth as a mitigating factor extends beyond the Court’s
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the Court held
that an individual’s age is relevant in Fifth Amendment Miranda cases, 192 relying on many of the same differences between juveniles and adults that the
Court noted in Roper, Graham, and Miller. 193 The J.D.B. Court pointed to numerous other areas of the law—property, contract, family—that demonstrated
a similar understanding. 194 In interpreting their own state constitutions, some
state supreme courts have issued similar opinions. 195 In State v. Lyle, for example, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the Iowa Constitution prohibits the

184. 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010).
185. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)).
186. Id. at 74.
187. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
188. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
189. Id. at 465, 471–72.
190. Id. at 473–74 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 76).
191. Id. at 476 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)).
192. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibits
prosecutors from using a suspect’s statements against him at trial unless the suspect was informed of the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney).
193. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 264, 271–277 (2011) (holding that age is relevant when determining whether a suspect is in police custody, thus triggering the suspect’s Miranda rights).
194. Id. at 273 (“Like this Court’s own generalizations, the legal disqualifications placed on
children as a class—e.g., limitations on their ability to alienate property, enter a binding contract
enforceable against them, and marry without parental consent—exhibit the settled understanding that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal.”)
195. See, e.g., State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378, 404 (Iowa 2014); State v. Houston-Sconiers,
391 P.3d 409, 420 (Wash. 2017) (“In accordance with Miller, we hold that sentencing courts must
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application of mandatory minimum sentences to all juvenile offenders. 196
Mandatory sentencing, the court held, is “simply too punitive” insofar as it
precludes courts from taking into consideration the culpability-mitigating
characteristics of youth. 197
A clear and consistent picture emerges from these cases. Courts recognize
that juveniles’ youth make them less mature, less responsible, and more susceptible to outside influence than adults. As juveniles grow older, their characters will change and therewith their inclination to engage in criminal
activity. The Supreme Court held that these unique qualities are reasons to
treat juveniles more leniently—either by categorically protecting them from
severe punishment, as in Roper and Graham, or by requiring judges to consider the mitigating effects of youth before imposing certain punishment, as
in Miller and Lyle. Although the specific holdings differ, each case concludes
that youth is a mitigating factor for punishment and that this factor has significant weight when determining a juvenile’s sentence.
III. PROBLEMS WITH RAI’S TREATMENT OF YOUTH
Courts’ treatment of youth as a mitigating factor in determining the culpability of juvenile offenders derives from traditional principles concerning
the punishment of youth. This Part argues that RAIs that recommend harsher
sentences based on an offender’s youth are inconsistent with these principles.
The argument here is not so much that the use of RAIs violates a specific state
or federal law but that given the sheer quantity and quality of criminal justice
practices that view youth differently, RAIs’ treatment of youth as an aggravating factor is an anomalous and wrongheaded discontinuity. 198 The only other
time in American history when the criminal justice system treated young people this way was during the superpredator era. Since we have moved away
from these destructive views, states should reject RAIs that threaten to replicate these mistakes. Section III.A argues that RAIs are incompatible with our
historical and present-day views of juvenile punishment, while Section III.B
illustrates the ways in which RAIs mirror the policies and practices of the superpredator era. Section III.C concludes by explaining this Comment’s
broader implications for the punishment of young offenders.
A. Inconsistency with Principles of Juvenile Punishment
RAIs are incompatible with fundamental principles of juvenile punishment. The U.S. criminal justice system has long treated youth as a mitigating

have complete discretion to consider mitigating circumstances associated with the youth of any
juvenile defendant, even in the adult criminal justice system . . . .”).
196. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 404.
197. Id. at 400–03.
198. Thank you to Professor Rebecca Eisenberg for this wonderful description.
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factor. 199 Two primary justifications have been given for this leniency: first,
juveniles have been considered less culpable than adults; second, it has been
believed that the proper focus of juvenile punishment was rehabilitation.
At almost all times in American history—and even before 200—it was understood that juveniles were less culpable than adults. At common law, this
view was enshrined in the infancy defense, which was justified on the basis
that young people lacked the moral understanding necessary for criminal culpability. 201 The Progressives took this idea to its limit, arguing that all juveniles, regardless of age, were fundamentally innocent. 202 The Supreme Court’s
decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller, which concluded that the differences
between youth and adults justify heightened Eighth Amendment protections
for juveniles, further support the general view that juveniles are less culpable
than adults. 203
Moreover, punishment of juveniles has historically emphasized rehabilitation over protection of the public. As far back as the eighteenth century,
scholars used juveniles’ unique capacity for reformation as an argument
against the juvenile death penalty. 204 The rehabilitation ideal was then reified
into the juvenile justice system, the original purpose of which was to transform juvenile offenders into law-abiding adults. 205 Today, after almost two
decades of public hysteria over the danger of superpredators, the juvenile justice system is refocusing on its original goal of rehabilitation, as scholars and
lawmakers advocate for and adopt new reforms to serve this purpose. 206 The
Supreme Court has similarly recognized that juveniles are “most in need of
and receptive to rehabilitation” and that “the absence of rehabilitative opportunities or treatment makes the disproportionality of the [life-without-parole]
sentence all the more evident.” 207
RAIs’ treatment of youth is completely at odds with these long-established
principles. Most obviously, RAIs substantially increase the risk of juvenile offenders being incarcerated and of their incarceration lasting for longer periods
of time. 208 This directly contravenes the Supreme Court’s unwavering position
that a juvenile’s age should be treated as “a relevant mitigating factor of great

199. The superpredator era was the only exception to this general rule. See supra Section
II.B.
200. The infancy defense predates the formation of the United States, having emerged in
English common law in the 1300s. See supra note 109.
201. Lerner, supra note 110, at 1586–87.
202. See RYERSON, supra note 120, at 36.
203. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005) (“Whether viewed as an attempt
to express the community’s moral outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to
the victim, the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”).
204. HALE, supra note 115, at 25.
205. Carter, supra note 117, at 719–20.
206. See supra Section II.C.
207. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010).
208. Stevenson & Doleac, supra note 5, at 3–4.
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weight.” 209 Youth’s strong aggravating effect in RAI calculations is due to the
fact that young people are more likely to engage in criminal activity because
they are more immature, irresponsible, and susceptible to negative peer influence than adults. 210 But these are the exact same traits upon which the Court
has “[t]ime and again” relied when affording juveniles extra protections under
the Constitution. 211 The Roper Court explicitly dismissed youth’s criminogenic effects as irrelevant to sentencing, acknowledging that “adolescents are
overrepresented statistically in virtually every category of reckless behavior” 212
while still suggesting that using the juvenile defendant’s age against him would
be “overreaching.” 213
The difference between the Court’s and RAIs’ treatment of youth stems
from a disagreement over the proper goal of juvenile punishment. The Court
evaluates punishment through rehabilitative and retributivist lenses, emphasizing juveniles’ greater potential for reform and their decreased culpability.
On the other hand, RAIs focus exclusively on incapacitation, which seeks to
incarcerate dangerous individuals to prevent them from doing harm to society. 214 RAIs promote incapacitation by providing judges with assessments of
offenders’ recidivism risk, allowing judges to tailor offenders’ sentences to
keep them in prison for as long as they are still dangerous. 215 Because youth
increases an offender’s recidivism risk, 216 incapacitation justifies its use as an
aggravating factor for RAIs. 217 In focusing only on incapacitation, however,

209. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 116 (1982)).
210. See supra Section I.C.1.
211. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011).
212. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (quoting Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior
in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992)).
213. Id. at 573. The prosecutor in Roper argued that the defendant’s age was an aggravating
factor. In response to the defense attorney’s argument that the defendant’s age should be considered a mitigating factor, the prosecutor responded: “Seventeen years old. Isn’t that scary?
Doesn’t that scare you? Mitigating? Quite the contrary I submit. Quite the contrary.” Id. at 558.
214. Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59, 99–100 (2017) (“Of
the myriad rationales for punishment that might underpin sentencing in general, the incapacitation rationale most squarely justifies the use of predictive evidence.”).
215. Id.
216. See supra Section I.C.
217. Even under the incapacitation theory, RAIs do a poor job of helping judges determine
a young offender’s appropriate punishment. Most RAIs only predict an offender’s risk one to
three years into the future, failing to take into account the possibility that an offender’s risk drops
significantly after that point. Eaglin, supra note 214, at 100. This problem is especially relevant
for age, which, due to the age-crime curve, has time-sensitive predictive power. Because RAIs do
not account for the decreased predictive power of youth over time, they encourage sentences
that incarcerate youth long after they have aged out of their main crime-committing years. Another problem that scholars have identified is that RAIs don’t consider the impact that the sentence itself has on an offender’s recidivism risk. Starr, supra note 15, at 855–61. This concern is
especially grave for young offenders, who naturally age out of crime and for whom incarceration
is more likely to have counterproductive effects. See supra Section I.C.1.
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RAIs are incongruent with our juvenile sentencing principles, which have
long considered culpability and the potential for rehabilitation as crucial components of the sentencing analysis for juvenile offenders.
To be clear, this Comment does not argue that incapacitation is an improper consideration in the sentencing of young offenders. Young offenders
who pose a significant risk to the public can—and perhaps should—be incapacitated for the safety of others. Even so, incapacitation is not the goal of
youth punishment. As past and present doctrine demonstrates, the criminal
justice system deems culpability and rehabilitation more important when it
comes to the punishment of young offenders. For this reason, the criminal
justice system has time and again provided juveniles more lenient sentences
and offered young offenders the opportunity to change, despite the recognition that young people are more likely to recidivate. 218 RAIs violate this commitment by focusing exclusively on incapacitation rather than rehabilitation
or culpability.
Even worse, RAIs encourage judges to overvalue incapacitation at the expense of other penological goals. As previously discussed, judges believe that
RAIs have statistical credibility, which encourages judges to rely heavily on
risk scores. 219 Compared to other sentencing factors which can be indeterminate, risk scores provide normative labels or explicit recommendations that
foster overreliance. 220 One study conducted by criminal law professor Sonja
Starr supports this idea. 221 In the study, subjects were more likely to give a
harsher sentence to a defendant with a higher risk of recidivism for the same
crime, even though the facts suggested that the riskier defendant was less morally culpable. 222 Thus, RAIs encourage judges to weigh incapacitation over the
traditional goals of juvenile punishment.
RAIs also undermine the legal premise that youth is a mitigating factor
for culpability, 223 encouraging judges instead to treat youth as an aggravating
factor. Although RAIs only provide information about recidivism risk and not
an offender’s character, judges may mistakenly believe that a high risk score is
also evidence of an offender’s increased culpability. 224 Judges often confuse

It may be tempting to suggest that states develop more nuanced tools that can account for these
problems; however, such arguments miss the mark. It ultimately does not matter whether RAIs
can accurately or effectively advance an incapacitation goal of punishment because our criminal
justice system has already determined that incapacitation is not the point of youth punishment.
Even if RAIs successfully promote incapacitation, this Comment contends that their use in the
sentencing of young offenders is still inappropriate given these principles of youth punishment.
218. See supra Sections I.C, II.A, II.C.
219. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
220. See Starr, supra note 15, at 866.
221. Id. at 867–69.
222. Id.
223. See supra Section II.C.
224. See Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 700–02.
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high risk for bad character in judicial decisions; 225 such conflation is especially
dangerous when sentencing juvenile offenders, whose most powerful culpability-mitigating factor also acts as a strong indication of future risk. 226 Judges
may interpret a juvenile offender’s high risk score as evidence of a depraved
character, when in reality, the risk score is heavily determined by age. 227 As a
result, the judge will have indirectly used youth as a culpability-aggravating
factor, the opposite of its traditional role in the criminal justice system. Criminal
law professors Megan Stevenson and Christopher Slobogin describes this inconsistency as the “wors[t] sort of double-edged swordism” and notes that this
problem is especially severe with respect to opaque RAIs like the COMPAS. 228
Because these tools fail to disclose the factors contributing to an offender’s risk
score, a judge using these tools may treat youth as both a culpability-mitigating and culpability-aggravating factor without even intending to do so. 229
RAIs also undermine the criminal justice system’s goal of rehabilitating
juvenile offenders. As previously discussed, RAIs increase juvenile offenders’
likelihood of being incarcerated and the risk that they will be incarcerated for
longer periods of time. This kind of punishment is counterproductive for rehabilitation purposes. 230 The longer a juvenile remains incarcerated, the
greater the disruption to the juvenile’s natural tendency to age out of crime.
While incarcerated, juveniles have fewer developmental opportunities and
fewer chances to develop prosocial connections with law-abiding peers and
adults. 231 Thus, RAIs that treat youth as an aggravating factor frustrate juvenile-rehabilitation sentencing goals. For these same reasons, RAIs may have
the self-defeating effect of increasing recidivism even if incapacitation is
deemed a legitimate basis for punishment.
In addition to undermining the criminal justice system’s fundamental
goal of sentencing juvenile offenders with an eye toward culpability and rehabilitation, RAIs also violate another juvenile sentencing principle: the individualized-sentencing mandate. During the formation of the juvenile justice
system, the Progressives argued that individualized sentencing was necessary
for effectively rehabilitating juvenile delinquents. 232 This call for individualized sentencing was later echoed by the Supreme Court in Miller, in which the
Court held that mandatory penalty schemes violate the Eighth Amendment

225. See, e.g., Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005) (observing that evidence of the
defendant’s “danger to the community . . . almost inevitably affects adversely the jury’s perception of [his] character”).
226. See Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 700–02.
227. Remember that for the COMPAS, youth alone accounts for 57 percent of the offender’s risk score. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
228. Id. at 702.
229. Id. (arguing that such a “result is both illogical and unacceptable”).
230. See supra Section I.B.
231. See supra Section I.C.2.
232. See Bazelon, supra note 119, at 172.
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because they prevent judges from considering the youthfulness of the offender. 233 Although Miller focused on mandatory life-without-parole sentences, its rationale can be used to justify the broader principle that the
sentencing of juvenile offenders should take into account “an offender’s age
and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it.” 234 The
Court deemed it unacceptable that all juveniles receive the same sentence and
“still worse” were juveniles to receive the same sentence as most adults who
committed similar offenses. 235
Like mandatory-sentencing schemes, RAIs undercut judges’ ability to engage in individualized analysis. This is true in two ways. First, RAIs inherently
rely on generalizations about groups of people (e.g., young people, men, people who live in certain areas) to make inferences about specific members of
those groups. 236 This problem is especially prominent with checklist-style
RAIs, which tend to make cruder assessments about even larger groups of
people. For example, Virginia’s Nonviolent Offender Risk Assessment
(NVRA) gives all offenders thirteen points for committing a crime under the
age of thirty. 237 Thus, judges who rely on RAIs make their sentencing decisions based on individuals who share similarities with the offender rather than
analyzing the specific offender himself, thereby violating the individualizedsentencing mandate. Second, RAIs only consider certain characteristics of an
offender—others not preprogrammed into the algorithm are totally ignored
for risk assessment purposes. As a result, judges who rely on RAIs may not
fully consider “the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant” to
the juvenile offender’s age. 238 In all these ways, RAIs are fundamentally inconsistent with our legal tradition of leniency for juvenile offenders.

233. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480 (2012) (“Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to
a lifetime in prison.”).
234. Id. at 476.
235. Id. at 477.
236. See Collins, supra note 16, at 65.
237. VA. CRIM. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 32.
238. Miller, 567 U.S. at 476. Of course, RAIs differ from mandatory-sentencing schemes in
a very crucial way: RAI use is discretionary. See Eaglin, supra note 214, at 61–62. Even still, the
fact that RAIs are so at odds with the mandate in Miller is problematic due to the influence that
RAIs have on sentencing. See supra Section I.B. The rationale behind Miller suggests that a juvenile’s sentence should be made with a complete analysis of the offender’s “wealth of characteristics and circumstances,” but a sentence that is based largely on group-based classifications
ignores this teaching. Some RAIs even recommend certain sentences based on an offender’s risk
score. In these jurisdictions, judges are invited to impose recommended sentences on juvenile
offenders without first considering the unique circumstances of their particular cases. See supra
note 37 and accompanying text.
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B. The Superpredator Theory Reincarnated
The push to adopt RAIs is a part of a broader movement that “aims to be
smart, rather than tough, on crime.” 239 The “smart on crime” movement attempts to use RAIs to address mass incarceration and to reprioritize rehabilitation by identifying low-risk offenders who are capable of serving their
sentences in community-based programs. 240 Despite this marketing, however,
RAIs are just another iteration of the overly punitive superpredator-era reforms.
Like the superpredator theory, RAIs result in the overincarceration of juvenile
offenders in two important ways: RAIs both perpetuate the misconception
that juvenile offenders are morally depraved and encourage judges to prioritize incapacitation over rehabilitation when sentencing juvenile offenders.
First, RAIs perpetuate the superpredator-era misconception that juvenile
offenders are morally depraved. During the superpredator era, juvenile offenders were not viewed as normal children whose lack of maturity, greater
susceptibility to peer pressure, and underdeveloped sense of self resulted in
bad decisionmaking. 241 Rather, juvenile offenders were considered “kids who
[had] absolutely no respect for human life and no sense of the future.” 242 RAIs
similarly encourage judges to view juveniles as morally depraved, as judges are
likely to misunderstand juvenile offenders’ high risk scores as evidence of increased culpability rather than as products of their age. 243
Second, both the superpredator theory and RAIs encourage judges to emphasize incapacitation over rehabilitation. During the superpredator era, lawmakers believed that juvenile offenders were being “coddled by a justice
system that clings to a discredited belief in rehabilitation.” 244 It was thought
these juveniles were so incorrigible that only by incarcerating them could the
public be protected. 245 No rehabilitative intervention could possibly fix these
individuals: if put in the juvenile justice system, they would simply do their
time until they turned eighteen, after which they would be released from their
cell back onto the streets as full-grown adults even more predisposed to violence and destruction. 246
Because RAIs reinforce these misguided beliefs, their use increases young
offenders’ likelihood of being incarcerated and decreases their likelihood of
being rehabilitated—a result completely at odds with the goals of the “smart
239. Collins, supra note 16, at 59.
240. See id.
241. DiIulio, supra note 131.
242. Id.
243. See Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20.
244. ELLIOT CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 2 (rev. & updated ed. 2013).
245. See Grim Reality Check on Youth Crime, supra note 133 (“Increasingly, we wonder
not whether they can be saved, but whether we can save ourselves from them.”).
246. See Krista Larson & Hernan Carvente, Juvenile Justice Systems Still Grappling with
Legacy of the “Superpredator” Myth, VERA INST. OF JUST.: THINK JUST. BLOG (Jan. 24, 2017),
https://www.vera.org/blog/juvenile-justice-systems-still-grappling-with-legacy-of-the-superpredator-myth [perma.cc/479M-JJ4E].
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on crime” movement. This counterintuitive effect is not as surprising as it may
initially appear. The first RAI for sentencing was adopted in Virginia in 1994
near the peak of the superpredator myth’s prominence. 247 Although the
NVRA was designed to facilitate diversion from prison, the tool was not
meant to uproot the previously existing public safety-focused approach. 248 Its
adoption simply meant that RAIs would be labeling offenders as dangerous or
not dangerous rather than lawmakers or judges—mechanizing the system, not
overthrowing it. Put simply, RAIs cannot promote a “smart on crime” approach to juvenile sentencing because, at their core, they are merely a reincarnation of one of our country’s most misguided “tough on crime” policies.
In addition to undermining the “smart on crime” movement, use of RAIs
also subverts recent efforts to promote racial equality in the criminal justice
system. Like the superpredator theory, use of RAIs results in racially discriminatory sentencing. A study that analyzed the risk scores of seven thousand
individuals in Broward County, Florida, found significant racial disparities in
the COMPAS’s false-negative and false-positive rates. 249 Though white defendants were mislabeled as low risk more often than Black defendants, the
RAI was twice as likely to mislabel a Black defendant as high risk than a white
defendant. 250 Because high risk scores are more likely to result in longer and
harsher sentences, the fact that Black defendants are more likely to be mislabeled as high risk is likely to result in oversentencing of Black individuals. 251
Just as the superpredator theory resulted in more Black juveniles being arrested, detained, and transferred to the adult justice system, so too will the
increased use of RAIs that treat youth as an aggravating factor.
Although RAIs do not directly take race into account, Black offenders receive higher risk scores because the factors used to calculate these risk scores
often act as proxies for race. 252 For example, many RAIs factor the crime rate
of an offender’s neighborhood into their risk score; crime rates are often
higher in urban neighborhoods that are densely populated with residents of
color. 253 Similarly, RAIs that use education as a risk factor will likely pick up
on the fact that Black and Hispanic individuals are less likely to graduate from

247. Starr, supra note 15, at 809.
248. See GARRETT ET AL., supra note 34, at 3.
249. Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu, Lauren Kirchner & Julia Angwin, How We Analyzed the
COMPAS Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-algorithm [perma.cc/HEU3-G424] (“The algorithm is more likely to misclassify a black defendant as higher risk than a white
defendant. . . . The test tended to make the opposite mistake with whites, meaning that it was
more likely to wrongly predict that white people would not commit additional crimes if released
compared to black defendants.”).
250. Id.
251. See supra Section I.B.
252. See Starr, supra note 15, at 838.
253. Id.
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high school and college than are white people. 254 Furthermore, almost all RAIs
rely on criminal history, another factor that is strongly correlated with race. 255
In 2015, for instance, Black juveniles were over four times as likely as white
juveniles to be detained or committed to youth facilities. 256 Thus, despite
RAI’s apparent race neutrality, the predictive factors they use are more likely
to result in higher risk scores for Black offenders.
This result is not only discriminatory but also inevitable. Despite proponents’ hopes that RAIs offer a new path forward, these tools mirror the past.
Risk predictions “identify patterns in past data and offer them as projections
about future events.” 257 Unfortunately, due in large part to policies enacted during the superpredator era, our past criminal data is racially skewed. 258 Black
people—especially young Black men—have been overpoliced and overincarcerated for decades, and RAIs will only reproduce these unequal results. 259 As
criminal law professor Sandra Mayson succinctly puts it, “bias in, bias out.” 260
The premise of prediction “is that we can learn from the past because,
absent intervention, the future will repeat it.” 261 But the death of George Floyd
in the summer of 2020 has galvanized a national reckoning with the criminal
justice system’s unequal and unjust treatment of Black people 262 and a determination not to let past harms go unremedied. 263 States that adopt and use
RAIs only project the past into the future.
Lawmakers must not succumb to the false hope held out by RAIs. Despite
attempts to undo the regimes of the superpredator era, many (if not most) of
these draconian laws remain in effect, and many of those sentenced under
these laws remain in prison. 264 Expansive legislative changes, once on the
books, can be very difficult to undo. 265 For this reason, lawmakers should
avoid compounding the destructive mistakes of the superpredator era by

254. See CAMILLE L. RYAN & KURT BAUMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EDUCATIONAL
ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015, at 2 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content
/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p20-578.pdf [perma.cc/H5W9-M6YR].
255. See Hamilton, supra note 19, at 77, 130–32.
256. THE SENT’G PROJECT, BLACK DISPARITIES IN YOUTH INCARCERATION (2021),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Black-Disparities-in-YouthIncarceration.pdf [perma.cc/YF6V-S32J].
257. Mayson, supra note 2, at 2251.
258. See supra Section II.B.
259. Id.
260. Mayson, supra note 2, at 2224.
261. Id.
262. Eliott C. McLaughlin, How George Floyd’s Death Ignited a Racial Reckoning That
Shows No Signs of Slowing Down, CNN (Aug. 9, 2020, 11:31 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2020
/08/09/us/george-floyd-protests-different-why/index.html [perma.cc/97JP-SS86].
263. Orion Rummler, The Major Police Reforms Enacted Since George Floyd’s Death, AXIOS
(Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.axios.com/police-reform-george-floyd-protest-2150b2dd-a6dc4a0c-a1fb-62c2e999a03a.html [perma.cc/4TZL-BQQD].
264. See Scott, supra note 147, at 548.
265. Id. at 548 n.81.
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adopting RAIs at sentencing. America has already incarcerated thousands of
individuals based on unfounded fears of juvenile violence, 266 and the system
created to imprison these young people has proven to be especially challenging to dismantle. Until more is done to reconcile RAIs’ treatment of youth
with the traditional and modern goals of the criminal justice system, states
should not adopt RAIs that treat youth as an aggravating factor.
C. Beyond the Juvenile Justice System
Though the inconsistencies between RAIs and long-standing criminal
justice principles are most striking when applied to juveniles, 267 the use of
RAIs is problematic for the sentencing of all young people. This is true even
for young people in the adult justice systems or who are above the legal age of
majority. Many (though not all) 268 of the historical and constitutional sources
described in this Comment refer only to juveniles. Nevertheless, these perspectives are just as informative for an understanding of the criminal justice
system’s treatment of young people generally.
Age-based cutoffs tend to be arbitrary and inconsistent, changing across
many different time periods and localities. 269 Take the juvenile justice system
as an example. As of 2021, the highest age of juvenile-court jurisdiction in
forty-six states and the District of Columbia is seventeen years old, but three
states (Georgia, Texas, and Wisconsin) have a maximum age of sixteen years
old and another (Vermont) has a maximum age of eighteen. 270 This is quite
different from the breakdown in 2009, where only thirty-eight states had a
maximum age of seventeen, ten states had a maximum age of sixteen, and
three states had a maximum age of fifteen. 271 The modern approach also con-

266. Moriearty, supra note 137, at 853.
267. See supra Section I.C (explaining that this Comment uses the term juvenile to refer to
individuals under the age of eighteen).
268. Consider, for example, the infancy defense for misdemeanors, which applied to offenders as old as twenty-one in some cases. See Lerner, supra note 110, at 1588–90.
269. This section only focuses on the age-based cutoffs within the criminal justice system,
but there are many other examples of conflicting and inconsistent age limits outside the criminal
realm. For example, individuals can travel unaccompanied at twelve, serve in the military and
vote at eighteen, drink alcohol at twenty-one, and rent a car at twenty-five. David Pimentel, The
Widening Maturity Gap: Trying and Punishing Juveniles as Adults in an Era of Extended Adolescence, 46 TEX. TECH L. REV. 71, 84–85 (2013).
270. Anne Teigen, Juvenile Age of Jurisdiction and Transfer to Adult Court Laws, NAT’L
CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/juvenile-age-of-jurisdiction-and-transfer-to-adult-court-laws.aspx [perma.cc/F2N7ZTLA]. Missouri and Michigan passed laws raising their maximum ages to seventeen; both laws
went into effect in 2021. Id. Vermont’s upper age of juvenile-court jurisdiction will increase to
twenty in 2022. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5103(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2020) (effective July 1, 2022).
271. Jurisdictional Boundaries, JUV. JUST. GEOGRAPHY POL’Y PRAC. & STAT., http://www
.jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries [perma.cc/BZG2-4P7Q].
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trasts starkly with the common law approach, where the infancy defense provided the only special treatment that young offenders received prior to the
creation of the juvenile justice system. 272
Similarly, the Supreme Court has created additional constitutional protections for juveniles under the age of eighteen, but this was not always the
case. Before the Court’s decision in Roper, prohibiting the death penalty for
individuals under eighteen, 273 a plurality of the Court decided in Thompson v.
Oklahoma that the Eighth Amendment prohibited the death penalty of any
offender under the age of sixteen. 274 In Roper, Justice Kennedy extended the
decision in Thompson to include sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds because
“[t]he logic of Thompson extends to those who are under 18.” 275
Judges sentencing young offenders should not engage in this kind of arbitrary line drawing. Even if the Supreme Court and state legislatures must
make such bright-line rules for workability purposes, sentencing judges are
not subject to the same limitations. Sentencing is an extremely fact-intensive
process; judges are given presentencing reports and hold sentencing hearings
in an effort to discern all relevant information about the offender. 276 This process, especially for young offenders, is supposed to consider the individual
characteristics of the offender instead of the categories to which they are arbitrarily assigned. 277 It is not the offender’s label as a “juvenile” or “adult” that
justifies offering them additional protections in the criminal justice system.
Rather, young offenders should be given additional protections because of
certain unique qualities that have consistently been deemed important in sentencing. 278 The labels of “juvenile” or “adult” establish a binary system by
which individuals are classified as having or not having these qualities. But
this system is both over- and underinclusive and is thus unsuitable for the individualized, fact-specific inquiry required at sentencing.
Rather than looking to these age-based cutoffs, this Comment instead
looks at the underlying justification for these cutoffs, namely, the distinct
qualities of juveniles that warrant their special treatment in the criminal justice system. This Comment contends that the logic of Thompson—and of
Roper, Graham, Miller, the infancy defense, and the juvenile justice system,
for that matter—apply to all young offenders, not just juveniles. 279 The
272. See Buss, supra note 109, at 19; see also supra Section II.A.
273. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
274. 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
275. Roper, 543 U.S. at 574.
276. See supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 232–238 (discussing RAIs’ incompatibility with the individualizedsentencing mandate).
278. See supra Sections II.A, II.C.
279. At least one federal district court has recognized that the logic of the Supreme Court’s
juvenile Eighth Amendment cases applies to young adults as well. Cruz v. United States, No. 11CV-787, 2018 WL 1541898, at *25 (D. Conn. Mar. 29, 2018) (“ ‘[T]he Eighth Amendment forbids
a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without possibility of parole’ for offenders who
were 18 years old at the time of their crimes.” (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012))),
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Thompson plurality stressed the cognitive differences between juveniles and
adults, arguing that because of these differences, juveniles’ “irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.” 280 But the unique
qualities associated with juveniles are present in young people generally. Recent scientific studies demonstrate that the brain continues to develop into the
mid-twenties and that young adults possess many of the same traits as juveniles. 281 Justice Kennedy acknowledged as much in Roper, stating that “[t]he
qualities that distinguish juveniles from adults do not disappear when an individual turns 18.” 282
The push to give young adults additional legal protections is gaining traction. Many scholars have argued in favor of an older cutoff age between juveniles and adults, citing neuroscientific research, mass incarceration, and
recent reforms as support. 283 And several states have in turn implemented new
programs designed to treat young adults differently than older adults. Examples include youthful-offender statutes that mitigate the sentences of offenders
under the age of twenty-five, young adult courts modeled on juvenile courts,
and expanded jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. 284
These reforms bolster the argument that offenders older than eighteen
ought to receive some of the protections offered to juvenile offenders, but it is
worth stressing that this Comment’s arguments do not focus on changing the
legal cutoff. The argument is instead that because young adults possess many
of the same characteristics that justify lenient sentencing for juveniles, use of
RAIs in the sentencing of young offenders is problematic regardless of the legal age of majority. As explained, the criminal justice system has long recognized that it is these unique qualities, not mere juvenile status, that justifies
treating youth as a “mitigating factor of great weight.” 285 Insofar as RAIs encourage judges to treat youth as an aggravating factor, they distort the sentencing process and create the unacceptable risk of disproportionate sentences
for all young offenders.
CONCLUSION
The use of RAIs that treat youth as an aggravating factor in sentencing
not only contradicts fundamental assumptions of the criminal justice system

vacated, 826 F. App’x 49 (2d Cir. 2020). The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion
in a summary order, holding that Miller applies only to those who were younger than eighteen
at the time of their crimes. Cruz v. United States, 826 F. App’x 49, 51–52 (2d Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 2692 (2021). As a summary order, the decision has no precedential effect. Id. at 49.
280. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
281. See supra Section I.C.1.
282. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005).
283. See, e.g., Josh Gupta-Kagan, The Intersection Between Young Adult Sentencing and
Mass Incarceration, 2018 WIS. L. REV. 669; Mullin, supra note 106.
284. See Gupta-Kagan, supra note 283, at 683–84; Requarth, supra note 175.
285. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S.
104, 116 (1982)).

December 2021]

Youth and Risk Assessment Instruments

579

but also undermines a new era of juvenile justice jurisprudence that attempts
to synthesize modern social science with principles of proportionality and justice. This inconsistency must be addressed by states that currently use such
RAIs in sentencing as well as by those contemplating adoption of similar RAIs.
Although this Comment does not propose a specific reform, its analysis
strongly suggests that lawmakers, judges, and scholars should—at a minimum—seriously consider eliminating the use of RAIs against young offenders
or developing new tools that avoid consideration of youth. These arguments
also provide support for solutions that have been proposed by scholars to address other concerns related to RAIs, including increased transparency surrounding how RAIs generate risk scores and increased education of judges
about RAIs. 286 These proposals may allow judges to use their discretion to
neutralize some of the problematic features of RAIs and to reprioritize rehabilitation, diminished culpability, and individualized consideration when sentencing young offenders. More research is needed to determine which reforms
are best suited to addressing the problems identified by this Comment. But
this much is clear: as currently designed and implemented, RAIs mirror the
destructive and discriminatory mistakes of the past and subvert the goal of
building a smarter and fairer criminal justice system for the future.

286.

See, e.g., Stevenson & Slobogin, supra note 20, at 703–05.

